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Abstract: Maritime regulators, port authorities, and industry require the ability to predict risk
exposure of shipping activities at a micro and macro level to optimize asset allocation and to mitigate
and prevent incidents. This article introduces the concept of a strategic planning tool by making use
of the multi-layered risk estimation framework (MLREF), which accounts for ship specific risk, vessel
traffic densities, and meets ocean conditions at the macro level. This article’s main contribution is to
provide a traffic and risk exposure prediction routine that allows the traffic forecast to be distributed
across the shipping route network to allow for predicting scenarios at the macro level (e.g., covering
larger geographic areas) and micro level (e.g., passage way, particular route of interest). In addition,
the micro level is introduced by providing a theoretical idea to integrate location specific spatial rate
ratios along with the effect of the risk control option to perform sensitivity analysis of risk exposure
prediction scenarios. Aspects of the risk exposure estimation routine were tested via a pilot study
for the Australian region using a comprehensive and unique combination of datasets. Sources of
uncertainties for risk assessments are described in general and discussed along with the potential for
future developments and improvements.
Keywords: risk assessment; binary logistic regression; spatial statistics; incident models; uncertainties;
monetary value at risk; incident consequences
1. Introduction
Incidents in shipping can lead to high costs and pollution damage to society. These costs vary
substantially as demonstrated by several selected examples of oil spills including the Exxon Valdez
(1989) with $USD 95B, the Sea Empress (1996) with £62M, and the Prestige (2002) with €778M [1].
The overall goal of any regulatory authority such as maritime administration or port authority is to
assess and predict risk exposure in order to enhance the selection and deployment of risk control
options (RCO’s) such as vessel traffic management, improved surveillance, aids to navigation, pilotage,
inspections and surveys, and emergency responses. This allows improved asset allocation at the
strategic level but also enhances surveillance to prevent incidents from happening at the operational
level. Risk exposure can be expressed using different metrics such as expected numbers of incidents
leading to a very serious and serious accident. This can also be converted into a monetary value
at risk (MVR). MVR is best understood as a monetary value that can be used as proxy for incident
consequences that are difficult to quantify. Wood [2] identifies four components to the costs of marine
incidents, such as lost assets, loss of cargo, lost lives, and pollution. It is very complex to estimate some
of these components since one cannot put a monetary value to the loss or damage to marine ecology
(Goulielmos and Giziakis [3], Grigalunas et al. [4], and Grey [5]). The Formal Safety Assessment
Guidelines provide an overall framework to address the various risks and consequences but does not
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provide any details to deal with damages to the marine ecology that cannot be quantified in monetary
terms. Cost benefit analysis and the evaluation of risk control options are primarily based on costs
to human lives and property IMO [6], which is understandable given that the main scope of Formal
Safety Assessment (FSA) studies is to provide evidence when big revisions to the legislative framework
are proposed at the international level, which is always a compromise. At the individual country level,
however, a maritime administration might choose to be stricter and perform strategic planning that
will allow a more refined allocation of its assets to avert incidents from happening in the first place.
The main emphasis is not directly related to consequences but rather incident prevention that can
lead to potential high consequences such as collisions and groundings where the associated damage
types are mentioned by Wood [2]. The layers presented, in this case, as part of the strategic planning
tool, cover the various components mentioned in the FSA methodology of the IMO but provide a
more refined approach for coastal states for medium to long term strategic planning aspects and
incident prevention.
This approach builds on the initial work of Vander Hoorn and Knapp [7] who introduce the
multi-layered risk estimation framework (MLREF) to estimate risk exposure and provide a framework
to expand on the various shortcomings of current risk assessments. While Vander Hoorn and Knapp [7]
demonstrate the potential use of the framework as part of a strategic planning tool (SPT), components
were still missing at the time, such as a method to predict risk exposure given changes in underlying
traffic or the integration of location specific correction factors for collisions, powered groundings,
or drift groundings that allow the application of MLREF at a more local level. The ability to allow for
different metrics to measure risk exposure that indirectly accounts for potential incident damage type
consequences also needs further refinement.
The contribution of this article is to introduce a method to predict traffic densities and subsequently
risk exposure and to discuss the integration of a spatial correction factor as well as further discuss
other extensions to account for consequences in a more refined way. The results of a pilot project with
the Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA) demonstrates the practical application of the traffic
density and risk exposure prediction routine for regions of interest: the Great Barrier Reef (GBR), the
North West (NW), and the South West (SW) regions of Australia.
Current approaches for risk assessment in shipping show serious limitations. Application areas
are either geared toward semi real-time operational aspects (Hueffmeier et al. [8], and Eide et al. [9])
or small areas using a micro-level approach or medium to long term strategic planning aspects with
limited prediction ability (DNV [10], BRISK [11], and Hansen et al. [12]). In addition, changes in
location and magnitude of risk given future traffic scenarios are not quantified since the emphasis is
primarily on real-time or near-real time applications (Montewka et al. [13]). Neither line of approach
allows the integration of fully automated routines in order to quantify risk exposure. More importantly,
risk is primarily estimated by modelling the geometry of the traffic and ignores the individual safety
qualities of vessels. As such, vessels are treated equally, which is unrealistic given that safety qualities
of vessels can vary considerably (Heij and Knapp [14], Heij et al. [15], and Knapp [16]) and are the
reason why port state control inspections or industry vetting inspections exist. If incident data are
used in the current approaches, it is not combined from various sources and biases and can, therefore,
influence the validity of results.
Another shortcoming of current methods used in the industry is that the underlying
location-specific environmental criteria such as the effect of wind, wave, and currents are omitted due to
the complexities involved in quantifying their effect on risk exposure. Furthermore, uncertainties in the
estimates are not identified nor quantified (Merrick and van Dorp [17]). Previous approaches to model
location-specific probabilities of oil spills provide very different results (Goerlandt and Stahlberg [18])
and demonstrate the difficulty in providing reliable answers. The lack of understanding of the sources
and magnitude of uncertainties makes it difficult for regulators to make policy decisions in order to
reduce risk to an acceptable level.
Safety 2019, 5, 42 3 of 17
2. Materials and Methods
2.1. High Level Description of the Components of the Strategic Planning Tool
Based on Vander Hoorn and Knapp [7], total risk exposure can be described as the combination
of risk layers as follows: (1) ship specific risk as a proxy to safety quality, (2) vessel traffic densities,
(3) location specific physical environmental parameters such as wind, wave, currents, and bathymetry,
(4) other environmental factors such as sensitivities to pollution, and (5) intervention effects of risk
control options (RCO), which can be deployed to mitigate risk such as e.g., pilotage, emergency towing
tugs, VTS, SRS, navigational aids, and inspections. Total risk exposure is defined as the integration of
these risk layers in order to assess and predict risk exposure for a given area of interest.
Figure 1 provides the components of MLREF (left hand side) as well as the visualization of a generic
use case scenario of the proposed SPT. Risk exposure endpoints are collisions, which are powered and
drift groundings leading to a very serious and serious incidents as well as candidates (irrespective
of seriousness). Endpoints can be extended in future applications. In particular, the integration of
estimating risk exposure in monetary terms to provide a proxy to consequences as demonstrated by
Vander Hoorn and Knapp [7], which included oil pollution or ship emissions.
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Figure 1. Generic end user application aspects of the strategic planning tool.
For strategic planning, the time frame is medium to long term, e.g., next five, 10, or 15 years.
The end user can choose an area of interest, an economic or business scenario (e.g., business as usual,
good economy, bad economy) and a time frame for future predictions. Other aspects such as change in
traffic composition (e.g., size of vessels) can be chosen. Based on the user input parameters, the system
calculates a baseline risk and future prediction scenarios where the magnitude and location of change
of risk exposure is most relevant.
The end user can then perform sensitivity analysis given the effect and combination of control
options (RCO) to find the best combination to mitigate risk, save money with improved asset allocation,
or make policy decisions. Examples for asset allocations could be (1) verification of pollution response
resources and arrangements, (2) verification of emergency towage asset location, (3) ship inspection
resource allocation, and (4) placement or evaluation of navigational aids. Policy related topics could be
to (1) assess/minimize emissions, (2) ad-hoc input into policy formulation in general, (3) introduction
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of new ship routing measures, and (4) visualizations such as change in traffic densities and/or risk
exposure over time.
As mentioned earlier, the risk exposure endpoints at this stage are collisions, powered and drift
groundings, and can be measures in various ways such as probabilities, expected numbers of incidents,
and the monetary value at risk (MVR) as proxy to consequences (Knapp and Heij [14]). If incident
costs are also considered as endpoints, then cost/benefit analysis can be performed. The developed
routine should provide an estimate of the uncertainties when possible.
One major difference to other approaches is that, in combining the first two layers provided in
Figure 1, the individual safety quality of a vessel is captured in addition to vessel traffic densities rather
than estimating risk based on the geometry of vessel traffic. It is believed that 80% of all navigational
incidents are somehow related to human error (Hansen [12]). Hence, the safety quality of a particular
vessel is assumed to be more important in most incident cases.
The next section provides the theoretical framework for development of the risk prediction routine
of the SPT and the integration of spatial correction factors so that the SPT can be used for macro and
micro level applications. The routine was developed within a pilot project in conjunction with AMSA
and relevant aspects are described and presented.
2.2. Theoretical Framework for Predictions at the Macro and Micro Level
The proposed method builds on the ideas presented by Vander Hoorn and Knapp [7] to combine
ship-specific risk and vessel traffic densities based on nautical miles travelled, which works well at the
macro level such as large geographic areas and where the micro level risk such as risk exposure at a
specific route is not needed. The routine is extended by providing a risk prediction routine needed
to run prediction scenarios for the SPT and by proposing an extension to integrate spatial correction
factors so that the routine can also be used at the micro level. The aim is to evaluate current risk and to
predict how the location and magnitude of risk exposure will change given an increase in future traffic,
e.g., five, 10, or 15 years. Uncertainties are identified and discussed when possible.
Vander Hoorn and Knapp [7] aggregate individual ship-specific risk with total traffic densities
measured as distance travelled to derive risk exposure at the grid level, which can then be aggregated
across large areas. Comparisons of this macro style method have shown that this works well at
predicting numbers of incidents across a large area such as Australia’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).
Ship-specific risk as a proxy to safety quality is based on Knapp [16,19] using binary logistic regression.
The statistical models are based on a unique combination of data sources (IMO, IHS Markit, LLIS,
AMSA) of five years of data regarding ship particulars of the world fleet, their changes over time, global
incident, and PSC inspections. Approximately 500 variables have been tested and separate models are
estimated for each incident type and seriousness if possible. Incident seriousness is classified based on
IMO definitions (IMO [20]). Please refer to Appendix A for a high-level summary of the logit models.
To provide traffic and risk prediction routines in order to estimate the magnitude and location of
change in future risk exposure via prediction scenarios of the SPT. A risk prediction routine needs to
be developed, which translates future vessel arrivals in port into risk exposure across areas.
Since risk exposure predictions are based on traffic projections, a traffic projection routine is
proposed and tested in a pilot project setup as proof of concept. It consists of a ship tracks from
automatic identification system (AIS) data, a route network (RouteNet), and a voyage database. Traffic
data from AIS is matched against a route network, which provides the entry/exit points of the area
of interest and accounts for all possible routes of the entry/exit points to major points capturing
around 80% of total traffic. The purpose of establishing a voyage database is to facilitate generating a
counterfactual traffic density based on an alternative scenario, e.g., traffic flow, pattern, and vessel
composition in the future (e.g., 2020, 2025). The voyage database is then analyzed to study aggregate
level spatial features of traffic, e.g., regional level patterns (aggregated over the year), and also enable
spatial risk assessment.
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Each ship track in the voyage database is classified according to its ship type and voyage
description, i.e., origin and destination along with additional summary information such as distance
travelled, days at sea, etc. At a very basic level, one could assume vessels follow routes as defined on
the RouteNet. Implemented in this way, expected traffic volume and pattern under a counterfactual
scenario can be extracted by simply applying the full set of port arrival forecasts to the RouteNet
and proceeding with the risk assessment. Further details on the voyage database and RouteNet are
provided in Appendix B.
Besides the traffic projections and, if the strategic planning tool is used at the micro level such as
specific routes or smaller regions, then location specific parameters need to be accounted for. A spatial
adjustment can also be considered if the data are available to reflect relative differences in risk between
areas. More formally, this is implemented by first defining risk for an individual voyage pi j as:
pi j = pi ×
di j
E[di]
(1)
where:
pi is the annual accident probability for vessel i (based on a vessel with ship particulars equal to that of
vessel i),
di j is the nautical miles travelled during voyage j of vessel i,
E[di] is the expected total nautical miles travelled for vessel i (based on the expected nautical miles
travelled for the vessels of this type).
Note that distance travelled is used, in this case, as a proxy for calculating risk exposure.
In principle, there will be many metrics that can be considered in this step such as days at sea, frequency
of collision candidates, etc. Defined in this way, the assumption is made that the effect of ship-specific
risk factors for vessels observed in the study region is the same as the global ship-level risk but scaled
(down), according to the fraction of traffic exposure. In other words, a baseline risk for a given level
and type of traffic based on incident models estimated on global incident data is defined and applied at
the individual voyage level. The baseline rate of accidents for ships of type k, and which enter location
s, can be obtained using the equation below.
λk(s) =
∑
ik, j
pi j(s) (2)
where:
pi j(s) is the baseline probability for voyage j of ship i having an accident at location s. Spatial differences
in risk between areas could be incorporated by:
λk(s) =
∑
jk
pi j(s) ×RRsp(s) (3)
where:
RRsp(s) is an estimator for the spatial rate ratio at location s.
The spatial rate ratio can refine macro level results and provide an avenue to make predictions at a
micro level. In other words, baseline risk exposure is adjusted based on geographic and location-specific
conditions. At this stage, a spatial rate ratio for collisions and powered grounding still needs to
be developed and a separate project is currently dealing with this aspect. Possible metrics could
be developed using AIS data, geographic information systems (GIS) data, or drift simulations. For
collisions, a metric that quantifies traffic complexity such as course orientations, crossing of vessels,
or speed could be used. For powered groundings, speed, and distance to a hazard is more relevant.
This could be accomplished via the creation of an available sea-room layer by combining bathymetry
and extracts of electronic charts. This available sea-room layer could measure the distance to a hazard
horizontally and vertically.
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For drift grounding, location-specific conditions influence the probability of grounding given that
the vessel is drifting due to the vessel’s exposure to the effect of wind, waves, and currents on the hull
of a drifting vessel. A spatial rate ratio could be introduced via drift simulations and by adopting
an approach suggested by Eide et al. [9] where the frequency of drift grounding is modelled to be
the product of the frequency of ship drift candidates and the probability of grounding given that the
ship is adrift. This is further influenced by the probability of self-repair, the time to shore probability
distribution, and the tug response time as well as the possibility of anchoring. Preliminary tests were
performed using three years of drift simulations, but results were not found to be suitable at this stage
to be further processed since the test area was too small.
Traffic density under a counterfactual (future) scenario can be predicted as follows. Let Dkp(s)
represent a baseline port level traffic density quantified as total nautical miles travelled (per 1000
vessels) at location s after aggregating across all j voyages of ship type k into/out of port p. Then we
define:
Dck(s) =
∑
p
Dkp(s)nkpRRckp p = 1, . . . , P, P+ 1 (4)
where:
Dck(s) represents the traffic density at location s under counterfactual scenario c for ship type k.
The double counting of vessels travelling between ports is avoided in this calculation, i.e., a
vessel that travels from one port to another is not counted twice as both an arrival and a departure.
The calculation involves the product sum across all ports of the port level density [Dkp(s)] , the number
of voyages for ship type k [nkp] to/from a port (in multiples of 1000), and the relative rate of change in
numbers of voyages for ship type k [RRckp] between the baseline traffic density and the counterfactual
scenario, which is estimated from the arrival forecast data.
In Equation (4), P + 1 represents the case whereby a vessel enters the area of interest but then
bypasses all major ports defined on the route net. The traffic density for P + 1 represents a relatively
small proportion of all voyages, but is needed here to capture total vessel activity.
The counterfactual traffic density is not calculated at the route level, i.e., it is based on scaling total
traffic flows at the port level. In theory, it would be possible to extend the method described in this
case so that any differences in relative changes at the route level can be reflected in the counterfactual
density. However, this would only be necessary if general traffic patterns along major routes for a
selected port/ship type pair were expected to change at different rates. Preliminary analyses of data
provided via the pilot project did not reveal that to be the case for Australia. In the future, estimation
of the baseline traffic density should be established with a larger baseline period such as three to
five years instead of one year only, as used in the pilot study. This would also give a more accurate
assessment of baseline risk.
Under the above approach, new routes could be added, and existing routes could be removed
from evaluation of the counterfactual traffic density. The total density under the counterfactual scenario
can then be derived by Equation (5) below.
Dc(s) =
∑
k
Dck(s) (5)
Under a counterfactual traffic scenario (e.g., traffic in 2025), the rate of accidents λck(s) for ship
type (ST) equal k can be obtained by the equations below.
λck(s) =

∫
s
λk(s) ×
[
1+Dck(s) −Dk(s)
]
ds for groundings∫
s
λk(s) × [1+Dc(s) −D(s)]γ ds for collisions
where:
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D(s) is an estimator of baseline (current) traffic density at location s summed across all ST.
Dc(s) is an estimator of counterfactual (future) traffic density at location s summed across all ST.
Dk(s) is an estimator of baseline (current) traffic density at location s for ST equal k.
Dck(s) is an estimator of the counterfactual (future) traffic density at location s for ST equal k.
Lastly, the overall accident rate at location s for the counterfactual scenario can be obtained as the
equation below.
λc =
∑
k
λck(s) (8)
The parameter γ links a change in traffic density to a change in risk and this is commonly set to
be equal to two. This assumption is inherently made by most maritime risk assessments whereby
collision risk increases according to the square of the change in traffic over time (DNV [10], BRISK [11]).
The temporal relationship between changes in traffic and change in risk may be more complex than this.
This assumption is used as a starting point based on available data and research carried out in this area.
Ideally, this assumption should be tested by, for example, analysis of time series data. The calculations
above are carried out first without consideration toward the presence of risk control options (RCOs).
Under this definition, a base case scenario is estimated, which can then be re-estimated after applying
the effect of an RCO (or joint effect of multiple RCOs combined). Estimates for the effect of RCOs are
a topic for research and are location-specific using expert knowledge elicitation. For the purpose of
illustrating the integration of this layer in the pilot project, results from earlier work performed for
AMSA (DNV [10]) are used but can be replaced once this layer is fully completed.
A future extension to aid with cost benefit analysis for asset allocation decisions with relation
to RCO’s for a coastal state could be to convert the end points into a monetary value at risk (MVR)
based on Knapp and Heij [21]. MVR is calculated at ship level and consists of three main components:
(1) yearly ship specific probability of a very serious and serious incidents denoted as Pinc, (2) five
damage type probabilities (cargo, loss of life, pollution, hull and machinery, and other third party
liabilities denoted as Pj and (3) the total insurable limit Vj based mainly on international conventions.
The total insurable value (TIV) is defined as the sum of all five damage type categories so that TIV =∑5
j=1 V j, which is multiplied by Pinc to obtain the MVR as follows: MVR = Pinc × (
∑5
j=1 P j ×V j). This
approach is conservative since it will not account for ecological damages to the environment, which
cannot be quantified but will account for oil pollution clean-up costs. Sensitivities to oil pollution could
be added to the strategic planning tool based on a GIS knowledge layer derived by expert knowledge
elicitation similar to the approach used by Carey et al. [22], which can also assist with oil pollution
emergency response along with the means to predict the change in traffic. This will mainly drive
change in magnitude and location of risk exposure.
The next section will present the results of a pilot project and provide a discussion about
uncertainties relevant for MLREF in order to highlight some aspects, which are normally not considered
in maritime risk assessments.
3. Results of the Pilot Project
Table 1 provides an overview of the data used in the pilot project with AMSA. Vessel traffic data
was used from terrestrial and satellite AIS systems (Automatic Identification System). Ship types
that form the basis for the methodology developed are as follows: (1) general cargo, (2) dry bulk,
(3) container ships, (4) tankers, (5) passenger vessels, and 6) all other ship types. Fishing vessels and
pleasure crafts were excluded. The pilot contained Australia’s EEZ as well as results divided into three
sub-regions: the North West Area (NW), the South West Area (SW), and the Great Barrier Reef area
(GBR). A figure of the areas is provided in Appendix B along with the RouteNet or major shipping
routes across the Australian EEZ.
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Table 1. Summary of data, data sources, and time frames used.
Data Time Frame Use of Data
Vessel positions
Source: 5-minute down-sampled AIS
data from AMSA
01/01/2014 to 31/12/2014,
pre-formatted, cleaned data,
linked with ship specific incident
type probabilities
Risk estimation routine
Calibration factors
Global INCIDENT data
Source: AMSA, IHS, IMO, LLIS
01/01/2006 to 31/12/2010
19,740 observations, data compiled
based on four sources
Logit models
Model validation
Regional incident data
Source: AMSA
02/01/1995 to 01/06/2013,
14,428 observations
(pre-formatted, cleaned data)
Model validation
World fleet data at SHIP level
Source: IHS-Markit 2006 to 2010 and 2012
Logit models
Ship type classifications
Calibration factors
Nautical miles TRAVELLED
Source: IMO, LLIS 2007, 2013 Calibration factors
Arrival forecasts
Source: AMSA Based on a Study
from Bramer Seascope
Number of arrivals by ship type
for 2020 to 2025 for all major ports
in Australia
Input data into the traffic density
projections and associated risk
exposure estimates
Note: AMSA = Australian Maritime Safety Authority, IHS = IHS Markit, IMO = International Maritime Organization,
LLIS = Lloyds List Intelligence, DHI = Danish Hydraulic Institute, BOM = Australian Bureau of Meteorology, CSIRO
= Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organization.
The raw dataset, which covers a large area, had to be filtered to select observations within
the Australian EEZ. Data errors also had to be filtered out (refer to Appendix B for areas and AIS
data-related issues). The project used estimated world-wide nautical miles travelled and average
days at sea from IMO (IMO [23]) for calibration purposes of the yearly ship-specific probabilities.
The logit models for ship-specific probabilities are described in Appendix A along with the data
sources of global incident data, global inspection data, and ship particulars of the world commercial
fleet. The ship-specific incidents are then merged with AIS data using IMO or MMSI if IMO was not
available. Arrival forecasts at ship level for the major ports and shipping routes across the Australian
EEZ was provided by AMSA.
Based on the methodology described in the previous section and the data provided for the proof
of concept, the following estimates for the baseline year 2014 and predictions for 2020 and 2025 are
provided in Table 2. The expected number of incidents is based on an increased traffic density forecast
and ship-specific risk without the spatial correction factor RRsp(s) of Equation (3), and, hence, an
application at the macro level. The effect for risk control options (RCO) is only provided for one sub
area since the effects were taken from earlier work undertaken by DNV [10] for this particular region.
For validation, expected numbers of incidents are compared with actual observations when possible.
Since spatial visualization of estimates and predictions are important for policy makers in order
to understand the magnitude and location of change of risk exposure for medium-term or long-term
planning aspects, some examples are provided. The results for expected numbers of collisions is
visualized spatially with a flexible resolution in Figure 2 and is compared with observed incidents.
The expected numbers were calculated for each grid based on the safety quality of the ships that
travelled in this area and the vessel traffic density, which determined the ship-specific risk exposure.
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Table 2. Expected numbers of incidents by regions and year (base case year = 2014).
Results by Year
Incident Type (Very Serious and Serious)
Collisions Powered Groundings Drift Groundings Total
North West (NW) 2011 0.50 0.64 0.97 2.10
2014 0.70 0.74 1.10 2.55
2020 1.04 0.91 1.39 3.34
2025 1.04 0.92 1.41 3.37
South West (SW) 2011 0.37 0.35 0.56 1.28
2014 0.42 0.34 0.51 1.28
2020 0.82 0.53 0.91 2.26
2025 0.86 0.55 0.95 2.37
Australian EEZ 2011 2.69 2.62 4.17 9.47
2014 3.31 3.01 4.87 11.20
2020 5.31 3.87 6.47 15.64
2025 5.73 4.05 6.90 16.69
GBR (no RCO’s) 2011 0.66 0.64 0.96 2.26
2014 0.85 0.74 1.16 2.75
2020 1.54 0.99 1.53 4.06
2025 1.84 1.08 1.69 4.61
GBR (with RCO’s) 2011 0.41 0.34 0.63 1.38
2014 0.52 0.39 0.76 1.68
2020 0.90 0.51 0.98 2.39
2025 1.08 0.56 1.09 2.72
Observed (with all RCO’s) 1.80 2.00 4.60 8.40
Expected (base case scenario) 3.31 3.01 4.87 11.20
Notes: calculations are restricted to AIS class ‘A’ vessels, EEZ = Exclusive Economic Zone of Australia, RCO = risk
control options, unknown ship types were removed from calculations, observed incident data within the EEZ reflect
any RCOs that were in operation during that period.
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Figure 2. Observed collisions (any seriousness) during 1995 to June 2013 overlaid (as yellow circles)
onto the risk assessment for collisions (very serious and serious) in the Australian EEZ.
The same type of figure can be provided to visualize change in risk exposure compared to the
baseline once suitable spatial correction factors have been implemented, as shown in Figure 3. It can
then help us to visualize how risk is spatially distributed and demonstrate the effect of risk control
options to mitigate (e.g., Pilotage, VTS, navigational aids, traffic separations, etc.) risk. An example for
change in traffic and risk exposure is provided in Figure 3 for the year 2020 and based on a ‘business
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as usual’ economic development. Ideally, various scenarios reflecting different states of the economy
(e.g., bad economy, good economy, etc.) and associated ship arrivals can be applied in the future to
see how these changes will affect risk exposure over time. The results can then be used as a basis
for sensitivity analysis by running prediction scenarios with different combinations of risk control
options. At this stage, spatial correction factors for collisions and groundings are not yet applied for
micro-level application.
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The categories used in Figures 2 and 3 to classify the risk levels are very low to very high.
The thresholds were based on providing a roughly equal number of grid areas for the ‘moderate’, ‘high’,
and ‘very high’ categories. All of the remaining grid areas defining the study area were then allocated
to very low and low risk. The expected numbers of events appear very low since the associated area
size (of a grid) is also very small (~3 nm2). These maps provide an indication of hot spots across a large
area such as the whole Australian EEZ since it provides the visualization of the risk areas in addition
to calculated figures, such as expected numbers of incidents.
Table 2 also presents a comparison of an expected number of incidents to observed events recorded
during a recent period (2006–2010) within the EEZ. These results were based on 38.3 million of nm
travelled and risk profiles of almost 7000 individual ships. Observed incidents were not accurate
and were, therefore, treated with caution due to the quality issues associated with incident data
mentioned earlier. Around 50% of the observations did not have coordinates (lat/long). Despite these
difficulties, it is, nevertheless, interesting to make informal comparisons against estimates based on
historical incident data. These estimates indicate that the base case scenario is about 5% higher (for drift
groundings) than what historical incident data might suggest and up to around 50% to 80% higher
powered groundings and collisions.
4. Discussion and Conclusions
The proposed strategic planning tool based on a multi-layered risk estimation framework provides
a relatively straight forward approach to maritime risk assessment at the macro level with the possibility
to downscale to the micro level by integrating a spatial correction factor. Its main purpose is to provide
maritime administrations and coastal states with the means to run prediction scenarios for medium to
long term planning aspects in order to allocate assets more effectively. The multi-layered approach can
also be adopted for the daily or short-term operational aspect where layers can be combined to create
an automated monitoring and alert system to enhance traffic monitoring. This will help coastal states
to know as early as possible if a potentially dangerous situation is occurring and intervene to prevent
incidents from happening in the first place.
The major difference compared to other approaches in risk assessment for strategic planning is
that total risk exposure is divided into layers at the grid level, which can be treated individually or in a
combined format. As such, the proposed approach allows the combination of the risk layers with a
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flexible spatial resolution. One of its main advantages is that it starts at the ship level by capturing
safety qualities of ships that trade in a specific area and which can, therefore, reflect how risk will be
heterogenous across ships as well as areas.
Several extensions of this application include: (1) to improve estimation of risk at different spatial
scales, (2) to assess risk over time, and to (3) predict risk in the future given risk control scenarios
and, lastly, (4) to use a combination of the risk layers to create an automated surveillance and alert
system to enhance incident prevention. Another possible extension is to add a metric that quantifies
potential incident consequences, e.g., the monetary value at risk, which can be estimated at the ship
level and aggregated across spatial areas. This would allow improved cost benefit analysis against
capital expenditures for asset allocation relevant for strategic planning. The key component for all uses
is ship traffic whether it bein real-time or for longer-term traffic predictions. In order to understand
risk exposure, the magnitude and location of change in traffic needs to be examined so that change in
risk exposure can be monitored over time.
Several areas for future research are identified to extend the framework for its use at the micro
level. To increase accuracy in areas where this is most relevant, a location specific weighting factor
(referred to here as a spatial rate ratio) should be developed and integrated into the routine as a
separate layer. This could be based on, for instance, historical candidates or it could be derived by a
proxy variable that can describe traffic geometry such as, for instance, COG (course over ground), the
average angle between passing ships, or another suitable proxy.
The current prediction routine still relies on the assumed temporal relationship of the average
number of collision encounters being proportional to the number of nm travelled squared, which is
widely used in maritime risk assessments for collisions based primarily on the geographic approach.
The temporal relationship between changes in traffic and risk exposure may be more complex and
might also have a seasonal component and this assumption should be tested.
For strategic planning purposes, risk can (whether they are expected numbers of incidents or
monetary value at risk), in theory, be calculated for each of the main shipping routes in the future
or for areas of interest to a maritime administration. The most important layer extensions to the
framework presented in this case are, therefore, associated with location-specific risk parameters such
as risk control options or underlying environmental conditions (wind, waves, and currents) or coastal
sensitivities to oil pollution. Another layer that could improve risk prediction for all endpoints is
the creation of an available sea-room layer, which quantifies distance to a hazard at the horizontal
and vertical level. A logical extension of endpoints would be to add oil pollution and to distinguish
between the amount of oil on water and on the coast. While the amount of oil is of interest with
respect to strategic planning of oil pollution response assets, the monetary value at risk can provide an
indication of damage costs associated with oil pollution, and will enable quantifying of all damages to
the marine ecology. Since it is not possible to quantify damages to the marine ecology without a large
degree of uncertainty, an alternative way to add this part is via a GIS knowledge layer that quantifies
coastal sensitivities to oil pollution at a grid level using qualitative methods such as expert elicitation
described earlier.
Lastly, another application of the framework, which is also heavily based on traffic, is to add
a routine to estimate air pollution from shipping. To determine hazards, this would have to be
coupled with chemical transport modelling and impact assessment on humans and the environment.
The framework presented in this case could help address questions involving future scenarios of air
pollution from shipping by combining data on pollutant inventories with traffic projections.
One problem with current approaches in maritime risk assessment is that the decision maker
is led to believe that the results are definitive and in no way uncertain. The general concept of
uncertainty of risk assessment is well established in the literature (Hayes [24]) including the various
types of uncertainties. The majority of approaches to maritime risk assessment do not attempt to
quantify uncertainty (Merrick and van Dorp [17], Eide et al. [9]). Furthermore, in the few cases where
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uncertainty intervals are provided, authors take great care to acknowledge the wide range of sources
and assumptions and highlight that complete quantification of uncertainty is not possible.
Uncertainties arise from input data, parameter estimates, as along with simplifications and
assumptions used in the modelling approach. If qualitative methods are used based on subjective
judgement, additional challenges arise, which is mostly relevant for estimating the effects of risk control
options (RCO’s) and sensitivities to oil pollution. These could be due to different perceptions, beliefs,
and experiences and cognitive biases (Pidgeon et al. [25], Rohrmann [26], Kahneman & Tversky [27],
and Fischhoff et al. [28]). In order to handle uncertainty within the general framework proposed
in this scenario, uncertainty arising from each source would first need to be considered separately.
Several sources of uncertainty that should be considered under the framework presented earlier are
described below.
Describing current traffic activity within major regions is of interest to maritime administrations in
an operational context as well as for longer-term planning purposes. The risk assessment presented in
this scenario is based on one year of AIS data. The next step that would be reasonably straight forward
is to apply the method to a longer time series of AIS data in order to gain a better understanding of
spatial-temporal variations in traffic behavior. This could be undertaken at a relatively fine geographical
mesh level and then be aggregated up to any area of interest. It is unlikely there would be a marked
variation in total distance travelled yearly but would be useful to examine variation at the sub-regional
level (or for major routes) and/or specific subgroups of the vessel types.
Ship-specific risk probabilities used in this framework are estimated based on a combined dataset
consisting of global incident data and global world fleet data based on Knapp [16,20] using statistical
models. A related matter concerns the assumption being made when making extrapolations into
the future. Logically, it is likely that risk profiles will also change over time. Not only because
composition of the vessel cohort will change but also because underlying risk for vessels with the
same ship particulars may be different in five or 10 years from what it is today. For example, in the
case of collision incidents, risk for a given vessel depends not only on its own safety quality but also
interaction with other vessels where the density will clearly vary over time as well as change in the
legislative framework. The conventional rule of “change in risk of collision is proportional to the square of
change in traffic” has been adopted in this case. However, there is uncertainty in this assumption and
testing this relationship is left as a topic for future research.
Changes in the legislative framework might be difficult to anticipate but will influence safety
standards for future vessels over and above what might be predicted by the incident models currently
available. For example, even though we may be able to forecast what the composition of the vessel
fleet may look like for a particular region based on anticipated changes in trade. Those vessels may
have somewhat different safety standards. The tendency for most ship types is also an increase in
ship size. This is the reason we can only provide predictions of what risk may be in the future by
applying our incident models to a given counterfactual traffic scenario assuming that all else is constant.
This may be an area that can be further investigated since new risk factors become relevant, e.g., due to
changes in the size of vessels and associated safety qualities. Lastly, forecasting future traffic is itself
inherently uncertain.
Furthermore, uncertainties are associated with numerical models that describe the physical
processes of how the combined forces of wind, waves, and currents act upon the hull of drifting vessels
or how oil spreads across water. Input data to model metocean data present uncertainties in their
own rights.
Uncertainty intervals for incident rates can be derived directly from historical incident data. Note
that this is not the same as quantifying the uncertainty inherent in modelling the underlying system
and does not directly address the questions raised above. Historical data on maritime incidents are
of poor quality, usually under-reported, and will contain substantial data errors. Global incident
data used for this work was compiled from four different data sources (IMO, IHS Markit, LLIS, and
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the Australian Maritime Safety Authority) reflecting the challenges when basing assessments on the
incident data directly.
A comprehensive uncertainty analysis that addresses all of the issues discussed in this section
cannot be carried out at this stage. Information and data required to quantify the relevant uncertainties
is not yet available. Computer simulations involving different components of the maritime system
could (in principle) be carried out, which would allow assessment of the uncertainty across the system
including those individual components listed above.
It is important to consider that risk assessment should allow for multiple approaches since
each one will have its own strengths and limitations and, therefore, facilitate addressing different
questions of interest for a maritime operation such as operational real-time monitoring of vessel traffic
or medium-term or longer-term strategic planning. Different approaches may be complementary,
e.g., when a micro-level (mechanistic) model provides a better approach to quantify the effect of an
intervention in a specific area while macro-level models allow real time applications for larger areas or
strategic planning exercises.
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Appendix A. Logit Models to Estimate Safety Qualities of Vessels
The underlying sample data is a combination of ship particular data of the commercial world
fleet, historical inspection outcomes, and past ship incident data for the period from January 2006 to
December 2010. Global incident information was combined from four different sources, and duplicates
were eliminated. The remaining incidents were manually reclassified, according to IMO definitions [21],
for seriousness, which are very serious (including total loss), serious, and less serious incidents. Besides
manual reclassification per seriousness, incident initial events were identified when possible, which
forms the basis of the models. This allows a better distinction between incident initial events and
consequences. The following model types were estimated in Table A1.
Table A1. Model types.
Model Type Use
Collisions—very serious and serious Macro level
Powered groundings—very serious and serious Macro level
Drift groundings—very serious and serious Macro level
Drift candidates—irrespective of seriousness Micro level
The initial variables of all models and their respective groupings were selected based on
Knapp [8,13]. The explanatory variables included in the models are discussed below.
• Ship type, age, and size (GRT) at the time of incident;
• Classification society, flag;
• Country where the vessel was built grouped into four groups, as suggested by AMSA surveyors,
and interaction effects with age groups (0–2 and above 14 years represent high age risk, while
3–14 years represent low age risk);
• DoC company and group beneficial owner country of location;
• Number of deficiencies and incidents within 360 days prior to the incident;
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• Changes of ship particulars overtime, such as flag changes, ownership changes, DoC company
changes, class changes, and class withdrawals (within three years and within five years).
The base model used to estimate the models is the binary logistic model. Let xi contain the
explanatory factors such as age, size, flag, classification society, and owner. Then the logit model
postulates that P (yi = 1|xi) = F (xiβ), where the weights β consist of a vector of unknown parameters and
F is a cumulative distribution function (CDF). A popular choice is the CDF of the logistic distribution,
which gives the well-known logit model. This model states the following.
P(yi = 1|xi) = e
xiβ
1+ exiβ
where:
xiβ is a weighted average of all explanatory variables mentioned before. The probabilities are estimated
at the individual ship level (i). The coefficients are estimated by a quasi-maximum likelihood to allow
for possible mis-specification of the assumed logistic CDF.
Appendix B. Voyage Database and AIS Data Processing
For the purpose of the pilot, one year of satellite and terrestrial AIS data, and AMSA’s RouteNet
(Figure A1) was used to generate a voyage database. The purpose of establishing a voyage database is
to facilitate generating a counterfactual traffic density based on an alternative scenario, e.g., traffic flow,
pattern, and vessel composition in the future (e.g., 2020 and 2025).
Each ship track in the voyage database is classified according to its ship type and voyage
description, i.e., origin and destination along with additional summary information such as distance
travelled, days at sea, etc. A simpler approach to describing traffic flow along the RouteNet was also
considered. At a very basic level, one could assume vessels follow routes, as defined on the RouteNet.
Implemented in this way, expected traffic volume and pattern under a counterfactual scenario can be
extracted by simply applying the full set of port arrival forecasts to the RouteNet and proceeding with
the risk assessment. However, in many ways, this would be inadequate since the simplification of
reducing traffic movement to a one-dimensional (linear) model, even at an aggregate level, would
ignore the fuller spatial aspects of traffic (and risk), which will likely be needed to address particular
risk-related questions that arise later.
One such area of interest concerns testing whether abnormal vessel behavior might be assisted
with the establishment of a database containing ‘normative’ ship tracks. Furthermore, while, to a large
extent, vessels often do follow a prescribed single path from the point of origin to the destination,
understanding where and when this does not occur should be a part of any maritime risk assessment.
The voyage database consists of a collection of spatial lines representing the full set of voyages
departing/ending in each major port defined on the RouteNet. The corresponding position on the EEZ
boundary is also tagged for each voyage that leaves the EEZ region.
Let SLij represent the spatial line that summarizes the complete set of movements for voyage j of
ship type i. For every voyage SLij, a record is also created and added to other summary level data to be
used as an index to the actual ship track database SL.
For each SLij, the corresponding distance travelled dij together with other high-level summary data,
is recorded on the index dataset. For the analyses carried out, each voyage was further disaggregated,
according to the portion corresponding to activity within a port area. Although this disaggregation
was not required for the current project, several exploratory analyses have been carried out to study
aggregate level vessel behavior at the port level, e.g., port level traffic density and inter-arrival times.
The voyage database also captures other details that may be of interest including whether
the vessel enters the EEZ region and bypasses major ports. Preliminary findings indicate that this
comprises a relatively small proportion of total traffic. However, it is still required for the purpose of
the risk assessment.
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Each ship track recorded in the voyage database is classified according to the following
five categories.
1. port2ee: ship track from port to entry/exit (ee) wayward point on the EEZ boundary
2. ee2port: ship track from ee to port
3. port2port: ship track from port to port
4. port: ship track within port
5. ee2ee: ship track from ee to ee, i.e., voyage not tagged as arriving at a port defined on the RouteNet
where:
• Vessels can depart and arrive back into the same port in which case they are classified under
category #3.
• Travel for some vessels is restricted exclusively to within the port area. In practice, this did happen
with a relatively small proportion of the vessels included in sample data provided by AMSA.
• A port arrival was defined as a vessel staying for at least 12 hours within a 36 nautical radius of a
major port.
• Passing through an entry/exit (ee) point was defined as an intersection of a ship track anywhere
along the EEZ regional boundary. Note that ee intersections were tagged against major ee positions
if the vessel crossed within 90 nautical miles and were otherwise tagged as ZZ.
The definition of a journey passing through an entry/exit point (ee) on the RouteNet is somewhat
arbitrary. Different distance values were considered and the numbers of voyages appeared to stay
reasonably stable for most routes. A number of journeys could not be associated with a route as
defined on the RouteNet such as voyages travelling across the EEZ regional boundary but not through
waypoint defined on the RouteNet. Again, this does not directly affect risk calculations.
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Several algorithms were tested to clean the ship track data and remove anomalies due to
problematic AIS data.
• When a gap between successive AIS readings was less than 24 hours during which time the
effective speed was greater than 75 knots. An error is identified whereby the calculated effective
speed in invalid.
• When a gap between successive AIS readings was greater than 48 hours and 500 nautical miles
distance. This occurred mostly outside the EEZ region. Tracing of ship track data is reset for a
given voyage to avoid introducing potential errors.
• Single anomalies with invalid lat/lon are identified and removed, e.g., the vessel suddenly jumps
to an invalid coordinate, but then immediately returns to the original tracking position. Other
cases involving the AIS data show inconsistencies throughout most of the ship track data where it
is unclear which route the vessel is on as the positions repeatedly change back and forth between
two very different locations.
Designing an optimal set of routines for handling AIS data was beyond the scope of this project.
Specifically, tracks considered to be invalid were removed prior to analysis. The total amount of data
removed by employing this step was equivalent to removal of approximately 6M nms.
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